AGORA PUBLICATIONS @ UNSW
2022
A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design
Goeree and Kushnir, Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics, forthcoming
An Examination of Velocity and Initial Coin Offerings
Holden and Malani, Management Science, forthcoming
The Law and Economics of Blockchain
Holden and Malani, Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, to appear
Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents
Dessein and Holden, Journal of Law and Economics, forthcoming
Gratton, Holden and Lee, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, forthcoming
Brunner, Friebel, Holden and Prasad, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, forthcoming
Censorship as Optimal Persuasion
Kolotilin, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming
Kolotilin and Li, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming
2021
M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games
Goeree and Louis, American Economic Review, 111(12), 4002-45
Dixon and Holden, University of Chicago Law Review (online), April 2021
Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court
Holden, Keane and Lilley, Quantitative Economics, 12, 2021, 981-1019
2020
Hot versus Cold Behavior in Centipede Games
García-Pola, Iriberri, and Kovarik, Journal of the Economic Science Association, 6, 226-238, 2020
The Exposure Problem and Market Design
Goeree and Lindsay, Review of Economics Studies, 87 (5), 2230-2255, 2020
Do People Minimize Regret in Strategic Situations? A Level-k Comparison
García-Pola, Games and Economic Behavior, 124, 82-104, 2020
Non-equilibrium Play in Centipede Games
García-Pola, Iriberri, and Kovarik, Games and Economic Behavior, 120, 391-433, 2020
Should we Worry about Government Debt? Thoughts on Australia's COVID-19 Response
Edmond, Holden and Preston, Australian Economic Review, 53(4), 2020, 557-565
The Stochastic Reproduction Rate of a Virus
Holden and Thornton, COVID Economics 41, 2020, 100-128
Optimal Gerrymandering in a Competitive Environment
Friedman and Holden, Economic Theory Bulletin, 8(2), 2020, 347-367
Registration Costs and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Bhatt, Dechter and Holden, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 196, 2020, 91-104
2019
Designing Environmental Markets for Trading Catch Shares
Bichler, Fux, Ferrell and Goeree, INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49 (5), 307-396, 2019
Designing Combinatorial Exchanges for the Reallocation of Resource Rights
Bichler, Fux and Goeree, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116 (3), 786-791, 2019
Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium: A Non-Parametric Generalization of QRE
Goeree, Holt, Louis, Palfrey and Rogers, Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Experimental Economics, Eds. A. Schram and A. Ule, Edward Elgar Publishers, Chapter 13, 252-268, 2019
Stochastic Game Theory for Social Science: A Primer on Quantal Response Equilibrium
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, Handbook of Experimental Game Theory, Eds. C. Monica Capra, Rachel Croson, Tanya Rosenblatt, and Mary Rigdon, Edward Elgar Publishers, Chapter 1, 8-47
Akerlof and Holden, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 35(3), 2019, 489-512
2018
Linear Payment Rules for Combinatorial Exchanges
Bichler, Fux and Goeree, INFORMS Information Systems Research, 29(4), 1024-1043, 2018
What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs
Agranov, Goeree, Romero and Yariv, Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(3), 825-856, 2018
Synergistic Valuations and Efficiency in Spectrum Auctions
Goetzendorff, Bichler and Goeree, Telecommunications Policy, 42(1), February 2018, 91-105.
Noisy Introspection in the 11-20 Game
Goeree, Louis and Zhang, Economic Journal, 611(1), 1509–1530, 2018
The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons
Buckley, Mestelman, Muller, Schott and Zhang, Environmental and Resource Economics, 70(2), 363–380, 2018
Competitive Neutrality in Industry Equilibrium
Holden, Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law, Competition and Consumer Law Journal, 25(3), 2018
Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision
Ederer, Holden and Meyer, RAND Journal of Economics, 49(4), 2018, 819-854
Gratton, Holden and Kolotilin, Review of Economic Studies, 85(4), 2018., 2139-2172
Aghion, Fehr, Holden and Wilkening, Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(1), 2018, 232–274
Optimal Information Disclosure: A Linear Programming Approach
Kolotilin, Theoretical Economics, 13(2), 607-636
2017
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
Bichler and Goeree, Cambridge University Press, October 2017
ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism
Fine, Goeree, Ishikida and Ledyard, in the Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Ed. Bichler and Goeree, Cambridge University Press, October 2017
The strategically ignorant principal
Bedard, Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 548-561, 2017
An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma
Goeree, Holt and Smith, Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 303-315, 2017
Goeree and Zhang, Games and Economic Behavior, 101, 151-171, 2017
Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games
Cason, Sheremeta and Zhang, Experimental Economics, 20(4), 946–972, 2017
Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard
Bedard, Economic Theory Bulletin, 5(1), 21-34, 2017
Frontiers in Spectrum Auction Design
Bichler and Goeree, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50, 372-391, 2017
A Nobel Prize for Property-Rights Theory
Holden, Games, 8(4), 2017
A Process for Non-Partisan Redistricting
Holden in Joseph E. Tabor (ed.) An Illinois Constitution for the 21st Century. Illinois Policy Institute. Chicago, IL. 2017
Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
Kolotilin, Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk and Li, Econometrica, 85(6), 1949-1964
2016
Market Design and the Stability of General Equilibrium
Goeree and Lindsay, Journal of Economic Theory, 165, 37-68, 2016
Quantal Response Equilibrium: A Stochastic Theory of Games
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, Princeton University Press, 2016
On the Impossibility of Core Selecting Auctions
Goeree and Lien, Theoretical Economics, 11(1), 41-52, 2016
Reduced Form Implementation for Environments with Value Inter-dependencies
Goeree and Kushnir, Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 250-256, 2016
Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment
Casari, Zhang and Jackson, Experimental Economics, 19(4), 764–791, 2016
Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
Mierendorff, Journal of Economic Theory, 161, 190-222, 2016
Akerlof and Holden, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (4), 2016, 1849-1874
Holden, in G. Appleby and R. Dixon (eds.), The Critical Judgments Project, Federation Press, 2016
Voting and Elections: New Social Science Perspectives
Holden, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 12, 2016, 255–272
Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design
Holden, in P. Aghion, M. Dewatripont, P. Legros and L. Zingales (eds.), The Impact of Incomplete Contracts in Economics, Oxford University Press, 2016, 358-362.
ESEI PUBLICATIONS @ UZH
2010-2015
2015
Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making
Louis, Economics Letters, 133, 24-26, 2015
Goeree and Yariv, Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 15-28, 2015
On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types
Kushnir, Economics Letters, 133, 4-6, 2015
The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
Klose and Kovenock, Economic Theory, 59(1), 1-19, 2015
Extremism drives out moderation
Klose, Social Choice and Welfare, 44(4), 861-887, 2015
2014
Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales
Bichler, Goeree, Mayer and Shabalin, Telecommunications Policy, 38(7), 613-622, 2014
An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
Goeree and Lien, Journal of Economic Theory, 153, 506-533, 2014
Goeree and Zhang, Experimental Economics, 17(3), 421–438, 2014
Three-player trust game with insider communication
Sheremeta and Zhang, Economic Inquiry, 52(2), 576-591, 2014
2013
Mierendorff, Games and Economic Behavior, 82, 192-204, 2013
An experiment on supply function competition
Bolle, Grimm, Ockenfels and Del Pozo, European Economic Review, 63, 170-185, 2013
Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network‐Flow Approach
Che, Kim and Mierendorff, Econometrica, 81(6), 2487-2520, 2013
Harmful signaling in matching markets
Kushnir, Games and Economic Behavior, 80, 209-218, 2013
The arguments of utility: Preference reversals in expected utility of income models
Lindsay, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 46(2), 175–189, 2013
Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions
Goeree, Offerman and Sloof, Experimental Economics, 16(1), 52–87, 2013
Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
Coles, Kushnir, and Niederle, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(2), 99-134, 2013
Uncertain Demand, Consumer Loss-aversion, and Flat-rate Tariffs
Herweg and Mierendorff, Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(2), 399-432, 2013
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu and Shi, Econometrica, 81(1), 197-220, 2013
2012
Stable allocations and market design
Chen and Goeree, Nature, 492, 54–55, 2012
Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
Cason, Sheremeta and Zhang, Games and Economic Behavior, 76(1), 26-43, 2012
How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment
Zhang and Casari, Economic Enquiry, 50(2), 502-515, 2012
2011
An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
Goeree and Yariv, Econometrica, 79(3), 893-921, 2011
Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment
Brunner, Camerer and Goeree, American Economic Review, 101(2), 1029-40, 2011
Price Discovery in Emissions Permit Auctions
Burtraw, Goeree, Holt, Myers, Palmer and Shobe, Research in Experimental Economics: Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability, Eds. Mark Isaac and Douglas Norton, EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED, 14, 11-36
Asymmetric reduced form Auctions
Mierendorff, Economics Letters, 110(1), 41-44, 2011
Correlated Individual Differences and Choice Prediction
Lindsay, Games, 2(1), 16-20, 2011
An Experimental Study of Auctions versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits
Goeree, Holt, Palmer, Shobe and Burtraw, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2-3), 514-525, 2011
2010
Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction
Goeree and Holt, Games and Economic Behavior, 70(1), 146-169, 2010
An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats
Brunner, Goeree, Holt and Ledyard, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 39-57, 2010
Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp and Yariv, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 183-203, 2010
An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emission Allowances Under a Loose Cap
Shobe, Palmer, Myers, Holt, Goeree and Burtraw, Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 39(2), 162-175, 2010
Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
Sheremeta and Zhang, Social Choice and Welfare, 35(2), 1175–197, 2010