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Violations of First Order Stochastic Dominance

Brett Williams, Journal of the Economic Science Association

Sealed-Bid versus Ascending Spectrum Auctions

Bedard, Goeree, Louis and Zhang, Experimental Economics, forthcoming


A Geometric Approach to Mechanism Design

Goeree and Kushnir, Journal of Political Economy: Microeconomics, forthcoming

An Examination of Velocity and Initial Coin Offerings

Holden and Malani, Management Science, forthcoming

The Law and Economics of Blockchain

Holden and Malani, Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, to appear

Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents

Dessein and Holden, Journal of Law and Economics, forthcoming

Political Capital

Gratton, Holden and Lee, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, forthcoming

Incentives to Discover Talent

Brunner, Friebel, Holden and Prasad, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, forthcoming

Censorship as Optimal Persuasion

Kolotilin, Mylovanov and Zapechelnyuk, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming

Relational Communication

Kolotilin and Li, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming



M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games

Goeree and Louis, American Economic Review, 111(12), 4002-45

Comparative Constitutional Studies:  From Matching and the Most Similar Cases Principle to Synthetic Control?

Dixon and Holden, University of Chicago Law Review (online), April 2021

Peer Effects on the United States Supreme Court

Holden, Keane and Lilley, Quantitative Economics, 12, 2021, 981-1019


Hot versus Cold Behavior in Centipede Games

García-Pola, Iriberri, and Kovarik, Journal of the Economic Science Association, 6, 226-238, 2020

The Exposure Problem and Market Design

Goeree and Lindsay, Review of Economics Studies, 87 (5), 2230-2255, 2020

Do People Minimize Regret in Strategic Situations? A Level-k Comparison

García-Pola, Games and Economic Behavior, 124, 82-104, 2020

Non-equilibrium Play in Centipede Games

García-Pola, Iriberri, and Kovarik, Games and Economic Behavior, 120, 391-433, 2020

Should we Worry about Government Debt? Thoughts on Australia's COVID-19 Response

Edmond, Holden and Preston, Australian Economic Review, 53(4), 2020, 557-565

The Stochastic Reproduction Rate of a Virus

Holden and Thornton, COVID Economics 41, 2020, 100-128

Optimal Gerrymandering in a Competitive Environment

Friedman and Holden, Economic Theory Bulletin, 8(2), 2020, 347-367

Registration Costs and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Bhatt, Dechter and Holden, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 196, 2020, 91-104


Designing Environmental Markets for Trading Catch Shares

Bichler, Fux, Ferrell and Goeree, INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49 (5), 307-396, 2019


Designing Combinatorial Exchanges for the Reallocation of Resource Rights

Bichler, Fux and Goeree, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116 (3), 786-791, 2019

Rank-Dependent Choice Equilibrium: A Non-Parametric Generalization of QRE

Goeree, Holt, Louis, Palfrey and Rogers, Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Experimental Economics, Eds. A. Schram and A. Ule, Edward Elgar Publishers, Chapter 13, 252-268, 2019

Stochastic Game Theory for Social Science: A Primer on Quantal Response Equilibrium 

Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, Handbook of Experimental Game Theory, Eds. C. Monica Capra, Rachel Croson, Tanya Rosenblatt, and Mary Rigdon, Edward Elgar Publishers, Chapter 1, 8-47

Capital Assembly

Akerlof and Holden, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 35(3), 2019, 489-512


Linear Payment Rules for Combinatorial Exchanges

Bichler, Fux and Goeree, INFORMS Information Systems Research, 29(4), 1024-1043, 2018


What Makes Voters Turn Out: The Effects of Polls and Beliefs

Agranov, Goeree, Romero and Yariv, Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(3), 825-856, 2018


Synergistic Valuations and Efficiency in Spectrum Auctions

Goetzendorff, Bichler and Goeree, Telecommunications Policy, 42(1), February 2018, 91-105.

Noisy Introspection in the 11-20 Game

Goeree, Louis and Zhang, Economic Journal, 611(1), 1509–1530, 2018

The Effects of Communication on the Partnership Solution to the Commons

Buckley, Mestelman, Muller, Schott and Zhang, Environmental and Resource Economics, 70(2), 363–380, 2018

Competitive Neutrality in Industry Equilibrium

Holden, Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law, Competition and Consumer Law Journal, 25(3), 2018

Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision

Ederer, Holden and Meyer, RAND Journal of Economics, 49(4), 2018, 819-854

When to Drop a Bombshell

Gratton, Holden and Kolotilin, Review of Economic Studies, 85(4), 2018., 2139-2172

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation--An Empirical Investigation

Aghion, Fehr, Holden and Wilkening, Journal of the European Economic Association, 16(1), 2018, 232–274

Optimal Information Disclosure: A Linear Programming Approach

Kolotilin, Theoretical Economics, 13(2), 607-636


Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design

Bichler and Goeree, Cambridge University Press, October 2017

ACE: A Combinatorial Market Mechanism

Fine, Goeree, Ishikida and Ledyard, in the Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Ed. Bichler and Goeree, Cambridge University Press, October 2017

The strategically ignorant principal

Bedard, Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 548-561, 2017

An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma

Goeree, Holt and Smith, Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 303-315, 2017

One man, One bid

Goeree and Zhang, Games and Economic Behavior, 101, 151-171, 2017

Asymmetric and endogenous within-group communication in competitive coordination games

Cason, Sheremeta and Zhang, Experimental Economics, 20(4), 946–972, 2017

Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard

Bedard, Economic Theory Bulletin, 5(1), 21-34, 2017

Frontiers in Spectrum Auction Design

Bichler and Goeree, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 50, 372-391, 2017

A Nobel Prize for Property-Rights Theory

Holden, Games, 8(4), 2017

A Process for Non-Partisan Redistricting

Holden in Joseph E. Tabor (ed.) An Illinois Constitution for the 21st Century. Illinois Policy Institute. Chicago, IL. 2017

Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver

Kolotilin, Mylovanov, Zapechelnyuk and Li, Econometrica, 85(6), 1949-1964


Market Design and the Stability of General Equilibrium

Goeree and Lindsay, Journal of Economic Theory, 165, 37-68, 2016

Quantal Response Equilibrium: A Stochastic Theory of Games

Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, Princeton University Press, 2016

On the Impossibility of Core Selecting Auctions

Goeree and Lien, Theoretical Economics, 11(1), 41-52, 2016

Reduced Form Implementation for Environments with Value Inter-dependencies

Goeree and Kushnir, Games and Economic Behavior, 99, 250-256, 2016

Same process, different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment

Casari, Zhang and Jackson, Experimental Economics, 19(4), 764–791, 2016

Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines

Mierendorff, Journal of Economic Theory, 161, 190-222, 2016

Movers and Shakers

Akerlof and Holden, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 131 (4), 2016, 1849-1874

Law and Economics

Holden, in G. Appleby and R. Dixon (eds.), The Critical Judgments Project, Federation Press, 2016

Voting and Elections: New Social Science Perspectives

Holden, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 12, 2016, 255–272

Incomplete Contracts and Mechanism Design

Holden, in P. Aghion, M. Dewatripont, P. Legros and L. Zingales (eds.), The Impact of Incomplete Contracts in Economics, Oxford University Press, 2016, 358-362.

Anchor 1





Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making

Louis, Economics Letters, 13324-26, 2015

Conformity in the lab

Goeree and Yariv, Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 15-28, 2015

On sufficiency of dominant strategy implementation in environments with correlated types

Kushnir, Economics Letters, 133, 4-6, 2015

The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities

Klose and Kovenock, Economic Theory,  59(1), 1-19, 2015

Extremism drives out moderation

Klose, Social Choice and Welfare,  44(4), 861-887, 2015


Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Bichler, Goeree, Mayer and Shabalin, Telecommunications Policy,  38(7), 613-622, 2014

An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction

Goeree and Lien, Journal of Economic Theory,  153, 506-533, 2014

Communication & competition

Goeree and Zhang, Experimental Economics,  17(3), 421–438, 2014

Three-player trust game with insider communication

Sheremeta and Zhang, Economic Inquiry,  52(2), 576-591, 2014


The Dynamic Vickrey Auction

Mierendorff, Games and Economic Behavior,  82, 192-204, 2013

An experiment on supply function competition

Bolle, Grimm, Ockenfels and Del Pozo, European Economic Review,  63, 170-185, 2013

Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network‐Flow Approach

Che, Kim and Mierendorff, Econometrica,  81(6), 2487-2520, 2013

Harmful signaling in matching markets

Kushnir, Games and Economic Behavior,  80, 209-218, 2013

The arguments of utility: Preference reversals in expected utility of income models

Lindsay, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,  46(2), 175–189, 2013

Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions

Goeree, Offerman and Sloof, Experimental Economics,  16(1), 52–87, 2013

Preference Signaling in Matching Markets

Coles, Kushnir, and Niederle, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,  5(2), 99-134, 2013

Uncertain Demand, Consumer Loss-aversion, and Flat-rate Tariffs

Herweg and Mierendorff, Journal of the European Economic Association,  11(2), 399-432, 2013

On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu and Shi, Econometrica,  81(1), 197-220, 2013


Stable allocations and market design

Chen and Goeree, Nature, 492, 54–55, 2012

Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games

Cason, Sheremeta and Zhang, Games and Economic Behavior, 76(1), 26-43, 2012

How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment

Zhang and Casari, Economic Enquiry, 50(2), 502-515, 2012


An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation

Goeree and Yariv, Econometrica, 79(3), 893-921, 2011

Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment

Brunner, Camerer and Goeree, American Economic Review, 101(2), 1029-40, 2011

Price Discovery in Emissions Permit Auctions

Burtraw, Goeree, Holt, Myers, Palmer and Shobe, Research in Experimental Economics: Experiments on Energy, the Environment, and Sustainability, Eds. Mark Isaac and Douglas Norton, EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED, 14, 11-36

Asymmetric reduced form Auctions

Mierendorff, Economics Letters, 110(1), 41-44, 2011

Correlated Individual Differences and Choice Prediction

Lindsay, Games, 2(1), 16-20, 2011

An Experimental Study of Auctions versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits

Goeree, Holt, Palmer, Shobe and Burtraw, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2-3), 514-525, 2011


Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction

Goeree and Holt, Games and Economic Behavior, 70(1), 146-169, 2010

An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats

Brunner, Goeree, Holt and Ledyard, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 39-57, 2010

The 1/d Law of giving

Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp and Yariv, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1), 183-203, 2010

An Experimental Analysis of Auctioning Emission Allowances Under a Loose Cap

Shobe, Palmer, Myers, Holt, Goeree and Burtraw, Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 39(2), 162-175, 2010

Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?

Sheremeta and Zhang, Social Choice and Welfare, 35(2), 1175–197, 2010

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